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INVOLUNTARY PSYCHIATRIC TREATMENT
AND OTHER COERCIVE BEHAVIORAL
INTERVENTIONS AS CRIMINAL
SANCTIONS:
REFLECTIONS ON VITE V. JONES
CARL J. CIRCO*
The social rehabilitation of convicted persons has long been a goal of
our criminal justice system.' This statement is so true that the term
"corrections" has come into common usage in reference to the post-
conviction phase of the system.2 The rehabilitative process may em-
brace a wide array of corrective treatments, frequently including psy-
chiatric treatments, behavior modification programs, and other forms
of behavioral interventions.3 Spurred by a recent United States
Supreme Court opinion, which suggests but then virtually pretermits
the issue, this Article inquires into the substantive limits on the power
of government to impose coercive behavioral interventions on criminal
offenders solely because of a criminal conviction and sentence.
* Assistant Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University.
B.A., 1971, University of Nebraska; J.D., 1976, University of Nebraska College of Law (with high
distinction).
1. See Allen, Criminal Justice, Legal Values and the Rehabilitative Ideal, 50 J. CRI_. L.C. &
P.S. 226 (1959); Radzinowicz & Turner, A Study of Punishment: Introductory Essay, 21 CAN. B.
REV. 91, 94-98 (1943). Rehabilitative and treatment ideals inhere in the historical development of
the extended penitentiary sentence as well as in the modem theories of corrections which empha-
size the socially beneficial alteration of the behavior of the offender through programs premised
on a medical or treatment model. See THE AMERICAN CORRECTIONAL ASSOCIATION, MANUAL
OF CORRECTIONAL STANDARDS 3-30 (3d ed. 1966). Dedication to these ideals undoubtedly has
waned to some extent recently. That fact is probably not so much a sign of a philosophical change
of direction as a frustrated sense that what should be done in the best of worlds seems to be
beyond our present capacities. See Andenaes, The General Preventive Effects ofPunishment, 114
U. PA. L. REV. 949, 973-74 (1966).
2. The state of New York denominates its entire codification of statutes concerning this
phase of the criminal justice system 'The Correction Law." N.Y. CORREc. LAW (McKinney
Supp. 1979). The governmental entity with responsibility over the post-conviction phase is the
Department of Correctional Services. N.Y. CotutEc. LAW § 5 (McKinney Supp. 1979).
3. Throughout this Article the phrase "behavioral interventions" will be used to refer to that
entire range of responses to crime which is based on the therapeutic model of the behavioral
sciences. See generally N. KnTm.E, THE RIGHT TO BE DIFFERENT: DEVIANCE AND ENFORCED
THERAPY (1971); R.K. SCHWITZOEBEL, LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE ENFORCED TREATMENT OF OF-
FENDERS (1979).
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In Vitek v. Jones4 the United States Supreme Court held that a state
could not transfer one of its convicted criminals from a prison to a
mental hospital unless certain procedural protections attended the
transfer. Justice White's opinion, which is the opinion of the Court on
all but one issue, held on two distinct theories that the transfer impli-
cated a liberty interest.5
First, the Court held that the Nebraska statute, which authorized the
transfer, created an expectation amounting to a liberty interest that a
prisoner would be transferred to a mental hospital only if he or she
suffered from a mental disease, which could not be adequately treated
in prison.6 The statute, however, merely empowered the Director of
Corrections to transfer a prisoner to a mental hospital based on the
recommendation of a psychologist or physician.7
Second, the Court held that even absent any statutorily conferred
liberty interest, "the transfer of a prisoner from a prison to a mental
hospital must be accompanied by appropriate procedural protections" 8
because "involuntary commitment to a mental hospital is not within
the range of conditions of confinement to which a prison sentence sub-
jects an individual."9 The opinion does not explain why this is so, nor
do authorities relied on by Justice White provide any satisfactory basis
for the conclusion.' 0 The majority ultimately adopted, without signifi-
cant discussion, many of the procedural safeguards that the district
court determined should accompany any transfer of prisoners, includ-
ing a notice provision and an adversary-type hearing." The majority
4. 445 U.S. 480 (1980).
5. Justice White's opinion was joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens in all
respects, and, as to be explained, by Justice Powell in all respects except one. See text accompany-
ing note 12 infra.
6. 445 U.S. at 488-91.
7. [W]hen a physician or psychologist designated by the director finds that a person
committed to the department suffers from a mental disease or defect, the chief executive
officer may order such person to be segregated from other persons in the facility. If the
physician or psychologist is of the opinion that the person cannot be given proper treat-
ment in that facility, the director may arrange for his transfer for examination, study,
and treatment to any medical-correctional facility, or to another institution in the De-
partment of Public Institutions where proper treatment is available. A person who is so
transferred shall remain subject to the jurisdiction and custody of the Department of
Correctional Services and shall be returned to the department when, prior to the expira-
tion of his sentence, treatment in such facility is no longer necessary.
NEB. REv. STAT. § 83-180(1) (1976).
8. 445 U.S. at 491.
9. Id. at 493.
10. See Part I infra.
11. 445 U.S. at 494-97.
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could not agree, however, whether the state must provide an indigent
prisoner with representation by an attorney. Mr. Justice Powell's opin-
ion, in which no other Justice joined, stands as the controlling law on
this point. Justice Powell determined that "qualified and independent
assistance" must be provided, but not necessarily through an attor-
ney.12 Four Justices dissented on the ground that the only prisoner re-
maining as a plaintiff when the case was argued before the Court had
already been released from the mental hospital, thus making the case
moot. 3 The dissenters declined to comment on the merits.
This Article's central theme arises from the second of Justice White's
theories concerning the constitutionality of the transfer process. In his
words, the issue was whether a convicted person retains "a residuum of
liberty that would be infringed by a transfer to a mental hospital with-
out complying with minimum requirements of due process."' 4 Part I of
this Article considers the bases for the Court's holding and exposes
some significant questions, which the opinion raises only tacitly. Part
II presents an argument for a more coherent theory of substantive limi-
tations on the power of government to utilize coercive behavioral inter-
ventions of any kind as the ordinary consequences of criminal
conviction.
12. Id. at 497.
13. Justice Stewart wrote a brief dissenting opinion in which Chief Justice Burger and Justice
Rehnquist joined. 445 U.S. at 501 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun authored his own
dissenting opinion in which he argued that "the issue is not so much one of mootness as one of
ripeness." Id. at 501-06 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The question of mootness was complicated by
the changing status of Jones. After the district court entered an order declaring the statute under
which Jones had been transferred unconstitutional, Miller v. Vitek, 437 F. Supp. 569 (D. Neb.
1977), Jones, who had already been retransferred to the prison, was paroled "on condition that he
accept psychiatric treatment at a Veterans' Administration hospital." 445 U.S. at 1260. At that
point the Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the district court and remanded the case for
consideration of mootness. Vitek v. Jones, 436 U.S. 407 (1978). The district court reinstated the
judgment in favor of Jones. By the time the case came again before the Supreme Court, Jones had
been reincarcerated in the prison on the basis that he had violated his parole. Throughout this
time, the state, as well as Jones, argued that the case was not moot. The majority held:
Against this background, it is not "absolutely clear," absent the injunction, "that the
allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur." United States v.
Phosphate Export Assn., 393 U.S. 199, 203 (1968); County of Los Angeles v. Davis, 440
U.S. 625, 631 (1979); United States v. W.T Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 633 (1953). Further-
more, as the matter now stands, the § 83-180 determination that Jones suffered from
mental illness has been declared infirm by the District Court. Vacating the District
Court's judgment as moot would not only vacate the injunction against transfer but also
the declaration that the procedures employed by the State afforded an inadequate basis
for declaring Jones to be mentally ill. In the posture of the case, it is not moot.
445 U.S. at 487 (footnote omitted).
14. Id. at 491.
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Although Part II explores both criminal and constitutional law theo-
ries, the principal focus is on the former. Furthermore, even though
this Article has been written largely as a reflection on Justice White's
opinion, the ultimate concern of the Article is much broader than the
constitutional issue before the Court in Vitek v. Jones. Thus Part II
seeks to identify substantive limits on the use of coercive therapy in
corrections. The conclusion reached is that there are significant sub-
stantive limits on that power, and that the primary source of those lim-
its is criminal law theory, rather than the constitutional principles
involved in Vitek v. Jones. Although significant arguments for consti-
tutional limits may be developed, they are more adaptations of the un-
derlying objections which spring from an analysis based on criminal
law principles than independent constitutional theories. Furthermore,
the broad question examined in Part II is posed without reference to
any specific institutional structure. Thus, the concern is as much with
how the question ought to be analyzed by a state legislative body con-
sidering whether to authorize or restrict the use of behavioral interven-
tions in corrections, as with the approach which should be taken by a
federal court reviewing such legislation.
I. VITEK V. JONES
The first theory advanced by the Court in Vitek v. Jones is an appli-
cation of the doctrine of Morrissey v. Brewer15 and Wolff v. McDon-
nell.16 Under Wolff, once a state statutorily confers on a prisoner a
benefit in the nature of a liberty interest, the fourteenth amendment
requires that the state employ appropriate safeguards in connection
with any attempt to deprive the prisoner of that benefit. 7 In Vitek v.
Jones the Court read the relevant Nebraska statute to create the inter-
est of a reasonable expectation that transfer to a mental institution
would occur only under limited circumstances.1 8 Based on this con-
struction of the statute, the conclusion that certain procedural safe-
guards had to be followed in any such transfer was, to use Justice
White's word, "unexceptionable."' 9
Presumably, a similar result would be reached concerning the subjec-
15. 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
16. 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
17. Id. at 557.
18. 445 U.S. at 487-90.
19. Id. at 490.
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tion of a prisoner to coercive behavioral interventions even without an
accompanying transfer to a mental hospital provided that a statute cre-
ated a reasonable expectation against intervention. One can easily im-
agine that this doctrine may become relevant if a state institutes certain
correctional programs which can be utilized only under specified con-
ditions. Special offender statutes commonly would constitute this type
of program. Moreover, the due process clause also may operate as a
procedural limitation when the state has created a reasonable expecta-
tion in the nature of a liberty interest through an administrative regula-
tion or practice of the correctional authority.2'
This first theory relied on by the Court, however, is not likely to con-
stitute a troublesome restriction on correctional authorities who seek to
subject offenders to forms of behavioral intervention less intrusive than
the kind involved in Vitek v. Jones. In most instances no statutory or
other basis for inferring an entitlement to freedom from the proposed
behavioral intervention will exist.
Even if the state-created entitlement doctrine does have significant
potential application to the state's ability to utilize psychiatric interven-
20. See Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605 (1967). Special offender statutes are frequently
enacted to deal with sexual offenses. THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW, 366-73 (S. Brakel
& R. Rock ed. 1971) (cataloguing twenty-eight states which have such laws). Although the laws
differ greatly from jurisdiction to jurisdiction and from time to time, many provide that following
conviction for any sexual offense (variously defined), an offender may be required to submit to a
psychiatric evaluation and, depending on the professional recommendations made as a result of
that evaluation, may be ordered confined in a psychiatric facility for treatment. See, e.g., NEB.
REV. STAT. §§ 29-2911-21 (Supp. 1979). Persons committed in this manner have been designated
by a plethora of labels, for example, sexual psychopath, sexual sociopath, sexually dangerous
person, sex offender, mentally disordered sex offender. See Note, The Plight of the Sexual Psycho-
patk A Legislative Blunder and JudicialAcquiescence, 41 NOTRE DAME LAW. 527, 528-29 (1966).
Another kind of special offender scheme was created but later virtually abandoned by Maryland's
controversial Defective Delinquents Act, ch. 476, 1951 Md. Laws 1343 (current version at MD.
ANN. CODE art. 31B (Cum. Supp. 1979)), which extended to any person convicted of specified
crimes (not limited to sexual offenses),
who, by the demonstration of persistent aggravated antisocial or criminal behavior, evi-
dences a propensity toward criminal activity, and who is found to have either such intel-
lectual deficiency or emotional unbalance, or both, as to clearly demonstrate an actual
danger to society so as to require such confinement and treatment under an indetermi-
nate sentence, subject to being released only if the intellectual deficiency and/or the
emotional unbalance is so relieved as may make it reasonably safe for society to termi-
nate confinement and treatment.
Ch. 476, § 5, 1951 Md. Laws 1348 (amended Ch. 558, § 5, 1957 Md. Laws 935). See generall
Tippett v. Maryland, 436 F.2d 1153 (4th Cir. 1971); Patuxent Institution Symposium, 5 BULL. AM.
ACAD. PSYCH. & L. 116 (1977).
21. Cf. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 599-603 (1972) (entitlement to job tenure may be
conferred by state administrative practices).
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tion in the normal course of criminal justice administration, the state is
ultimately in control of the extent to which the theory actually will be
available. Expectations which amount to liberty interests merely be-
cause state action created them can be prospectively modified or even
dispelled by appropriate state action. Presumably, a state could take
the even more drastic measure of commitment of a prisoner to a mental
hospital for treatment. The only change necessary would be a careful
redrafting of the sentencing statutes to specify that the appropriate cor-
rectional authority has the power to assign or reassign the convicted
person to any state institution or program solely by virtue of a convic-
tion and sentence. Of course, there is a danger that any perceived limi-
tation on that power might serve as a wedge to open the door to the
state-created entitlement doctrine. For example, if the relevant statute
provided that the state could make "appropriate" assignments or reas-
signments, or if a practice arose of assigning only mentally disabled
prisoners to specific institutions or programs, a prisoner might argue for
procedural safeguards under Morrissey v. Brewer22 and Wolff v. Mc-
Donnell.23
Even though the first theory advanced in Vitek v. Jones may not
bode significant limitations on the use of psychiatric and behavior tech-
niques in the corrections field, a substantial impact may result from
Justice White's second theory of the case.24 Justice White recognized
that the determination that a person has a mental disease and should be
confined for treatment in a mental hospital normally is a most serious
loss of liberty for the individual. Several recent decisions in the mental
disability law field place that proposition beyond doubt.25 The remain-
ing question was whether that sort of state action was still to be so
regarded when the individual involved was already subject to the
wholesale loss of liberty inherent in a criminal conviction and sentence.
A prisoner's loss of liberty interest, otherwise protected by the four-
teenth amendment, is great, but not total:
Undoubtedly a valid criminal conviction and prison sentence extin-
guish a defendant's right to freedom from confinement. Greenholtz v. Ne-
braska Penal Inmates, 442 U.S., at 7. Such a conviction and sentence
sufficiently extinguish a defendant's liberty "to empower the state to con-
22. 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
23. 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
24. 445 U.S. at 491-94.
25. See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979);
O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
[Vol. 59:81
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fine him in any of its prisons." Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S., at 224. It is
also true that changes in the conditions of confinement having a substan-
tial adverse impact on the prisoner are not alone sufficient to invoke the
protections of the Due Process Clause "as long as the conditions or degree
of confinement to which the prisoner is subjected is within the sentence
imposed upon him." Montanye v. Haymes, 427 U.S., at 242. " 26
The state's argument was that "the transfer of a prisoner to a mental
hospital is within the range of confinement justified by imposition of a
prison sentence .... ." Justice White's response to that argument
constitutes the alternative rationale of the opinion.
None of our decisions holds that conviction for a crime entitles a State not
only to confine the convicted person but also to determine that he has a
mental illness and to subject him involuntarily to institutional care in a
mental hospital. Such consequences visited on the prisoner are qualita-
tively different from the punishment characteristically suffered by a per-
son convicted of a crime. Our cases recognize as much and reflect an
understanding that involuntary commitment to a mental hospital is not
within the range of conditions of confinement to which a prison sentence
subjects an individual. Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107 (1966); Specht v.
Patterson, 386 U.S. 605 (1967); Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504 (1972);
Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 724-725 (1972). A criminal conviction
and sentence of imprisonment extinguish an individual's right to freedom
from confinement for the term of his sentence, but they do not authorize
the State to classify him as mentally ill and to subject him to involuntary
psychiatric treatment without affording him additional due process pro-
28tections.
The idea that involuntary civil commitment is outside the normal
contemplation of a prison sentence may seem uncontroversial. The
question with which the Court was concerned was not whether a crimi-
nal sentence normally authorizes involuntary psychiatric hospitaliza-
tion, but whether the Constitution forbids that result. The Court fails
to specify why this transfer was constitutionally different from the
transfer of a convicted offender from one state prison to another which,
under Meachum v. Fano ,29 is "within the normal limits or range of cus-
tody which the conviction has authorized the State to impose. 30
It is interesting that Justice White, the author of Vitek v. Jones, also
26. 445 U.S. at 493.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 493-94.
29. 427 U.S. 215 (1976).
30. Id. at 225.
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penned Meachum v. Fano and its companion case, Montanye v.
Haymes. 1 These latter two cases establish that the transfer of a state
prisoner from one correctional facility to another does not impinge on
any liberty interest protected by the due process clause, even if the
transfer results in significant adverse changes in the prisoner's condi-
tions of confinement or even if the transfer constitutes a disciplinary
action for misbehavior.32 In Montanye the Court held that a transfer
did not implicate a protected liberty interest "[a]s long as the conditions
or degree of confinement to which the prisoner is subjected is within
the sentence imposed on him."'33
One could infer from Meachum and Montanye that whenever a pris-
oner raises a constitutional challenge to a transfer, a preliminary issue
is whether the original sentence authorized confinement of the type that
the prisoner must endure after the transfer. There is no suggestion in
those two cases that the Constitution, rather than state law, determines
the nature of the confinement authorized by a state criminal conviction
and sentence. Yet, in Vitek v. Jones, the Court seems to assume that
confinement and treatment in a psychiatric hospital is necessarily ex-
cluded from the possible authority of a state conviction and sentence
unless Supreme Court precedent to the contrary can be found. "None
of our decisions holds that conviction for a crime entitles a State not
only to confine the convicted person but also to determine that he has a
mental illness and to subject him involuntarily to institutional care in a
mental hospital. 34 Surely there is no judicial principle which holds
that the decisions of the United States Supreme Court are the source of,
rather than a limitation on, the power of the states to formulate re-
sponses to criminal behavior.
These criticisms are not offered to prove that the Court erred in hold-
ing that a prisoner cannot be labeled mentally ill and subjected to in-
voluntary psychiatric hospitalization simply because of the criminal
conviction and sentence, but are offered only to show that the Court's
opinion fails to articulate the logical steps necessary to support that
31. 427 U.S. 236 (1976).
32. In Meachum the Court held that the due process clause does not require a hearing when a
state prisoner is transferred from one prison to another one where the conditions of confinement
are less favorable, "absent a state law or practice conditioning such transfers on proof of serious
misconduct or the occurrence of other events." Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. at 216. In Montanye
the Court held that the Meachum rule controls even if the transfer is disciplinary in nature.
33. 427 U.S. at 242.
34. 445 U.S. at 493.
[Vol. 59:81
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol59/iss1/7
BEHAVIORAL INTERVENTIONS AFTER VITEK
holding. The Court, in presenting this second theory of the case, es-
chewed all reliance on liberty interests created by state law. The Court
assumed that no state law or practice created the expectation in a pris-
oner that a transfer to a mental hospital would occur only under lim-
ited circumstances.35 The Vitek Court curiously felt obliged to deal
with this alternative theory of the case. The briefs reveal that the par-
ties did not thoroughly develop the theory, and the Morrissey-McDon-
nell analysis initially relied on by the Court was unquestionably
adequate to dispose of the case.36 Nonetheless, the Court clearly held
that a state criminal conviction and sentence alone cannot constitution-
ally authorize the transfer of an offender from a prison to a mental
hospital for involuntary treatment because involuntary psychiatric hos-
pitalization "is not within the range of conditions of confinement to
which a prison sentence subjects an individual," despite the state's ar-
gument that the sentence was intended to have such an effect.37
The Court's constitutional analysis fails to address several significant
questions. For example, what constitutional principle prevents a state
from responding to criminal behavior not only by depriving the of-
fender of physical liberty, but also by subjecting the person to involun-
tary therapeutic interventions, which the correctional authorities may
deem appropriate during the course of the sentence? And, if psychiat-
ric hospitalization for mental illness is outside the range of permissible
options available to the states, does the same constitutional principle
restrict the power of the states to utilize within their correctional pro-
grams other involuntary psychiatric treatments and behavioral inter-
ventions? Was the transfer of Jones outside the sentence simply
because the receiving institution was organized within the Department
of Public Institutions rather than the Department of Corrections? 38
Would the transfer have been less objectionable if no express determi-
35. Id. at 491-93.
36. See generally Brief for Appellants at 29-30, Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980); Brief of
Appellee at 24-37, Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980). If the Court had not held that Nebraska
law created an objective expectation that prisoners would be transferred to the mental hospital
only under limited circumstances, then the Court logically would have been required to deter-
mine, at least implicitly, whether a state could properly treat a criminal conviction and sentence as
authority for the confinement and psychiatric treatment of the offender in a mental hospital.
Under the Morrissey-McDonnell theory, however, that broad question could have been ignored
once the Court found that state law conferred on prisoners an entitlement amounting to a pro-
tected liberty interest. See also notes 15-21 supra and accompanying text.
37. 445 U.S. at 493.
38. Brief for Appellants at 12, Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980).
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nation of mental illness had been made,3 9 or if the purpose was not to
treat Jones for disease but to provide an environment more conducive
to effective security?40 One can only conclude from the brief discussion
in Vitek v. Jones, together with the Meachum and Montanye opinions,
that each of these factors may be of sufficient importance that the ab-
sence of any one of them from a future transfer case may be relevant.
The application of the holding to the coercive use of psychiatric
treatment or other behavioral interventions which do not involve a
transfer between institutions is even more unclear. Consider a large
prison facility which contains within its walls a psychiatric infirmary
where prisoners can be given the same kind of therapy provided in
mental hospitals.4 ' Would a reassignment of a prisoner from the gen-
eral population of this type of a prison to the psychiatric infirmary fol-
lowing a diagnosis of mental illness fall within the prohibition of Vitek
v. Jones? The answer to this question appears to lie in the Court's
39. It is apparent that the Court regarded the stigmatizing effect of the determination of
mental illness as an important factor relevant to the second theory of the case. The finding of
mental illness, made essential by the statute which authorized the transfer, see note 7 supra, was
clearly relevant to the state-created entitlement theory on which the Court initially relied. The
statute could be read as assuring every prisoner freedom from transfer to a psychiatric facility
unless he or she became mentally ill. But, of course, the state could amend the statute so that a
transfer to a mental hospital and involuntary psychiatric treatment could be authorized without
any determination of mental illness, with the practical result for a prisoner like Larry Jones virtu-
ally the same.
With respect to the second theory of the case, the Court held that "the stigmatizing conse-
quences of a transfer to a mental hospital for involuntary psychiatric treatment, coupled with the
subjection of the prisoner to mandatory behavior modification as a treatment for mental illness
constitute the kind of deprivations of liberty that require procedural protections." 445 U.S. at 494.
Would the Court have reached the same conclusion if the transfer did not entail a determination
that Jones needed involuntary treatment for a mental illness? Every transfer of a prisoner to a
mental hospital for involuntary psychiatric treatment does not necessarily imply a finding that the
prisoner is mentally ill. It might be argued, for example, that once a person has been convicted of
a serious violation of the criminal law, the state, without regard to any diagnostic or labeling
process, has legitimate interests in searching for possible causes of the offender's criminal behavior
and employing the most appropriate techniques available to ensure that the individual is rehabili-
tated during the course of the sentence. Thus, while an ordinary civil commitment logically de-
pends on the stigmatizing finding that the person committed is mentally ill, the transfer of a
prisoner to a mental hospital may indicate merely a correctional decision, authorized by the origi-
nal criminal sentence, that the rehabilitation of the offender would best be served by the special
forms of therapy available at a mental hospital.
40. "Transfers between institutions, for example, are made for a variety of reasons and often
involve no more than informed predictions as to what would best serve institutional security or the
safety and welfare of the inmate." Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 225 (1976).
41. Jones was confined in "the psychiatric ward" of the prison for a time following his initial
return to the prison, but not at the time the case was finally before the Supreme Court. Brief for
Appellee at 11-12, Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980).
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proposition that to declare a person mentally ill and subject the indi-
vidual to involuntary psychiatric treatment are consequences "qualita-
tively different" from traditional criminal punishment. The truth of the
proposition as an historical matter is unquestionable. The problem is
in understanding the constitutional significance of this empirical fact.
Justice White's opinion does not supply the necessary link. He as-
serts that prior cases "reflect an understanding that involuntary com-
mitment to a mental hospital is not within the range of conditions of
confinement to which a prison sentence subjects an individual."42 His-
tory again supports the conclusion that criminal incarceration and psy-
chiatric hospitalization have been preserved as distinct responses to
"socially disturbing" behavior. Because these two social institutions
are creations of the state, each designed to serve valid state interests, a
state should remain free to blur or even obliterate the distinctions be-
tween them if advances in science, evolving philosophical outlooks, or
both suggest that a change would further relevant state interests. Of
course, there are constitutional limitations concerning the interests
which a state can legitimately pursue and the actions that can be taken
to pursue those interests.43 The opinion in Vitek v. Jones, however,
fails to articulate any limitations which would prevent a state from in-
cluding among the ordinary consequences of a criminal conviction any
of the disabilities traditionally associated with a civil commitment deci-
sion.
The Court cites only four cases to support its central proposition.
The first of the cases, Baxstrom v. Herold,' not only failed to establish
an essential constitutional distinction between a prison sentence and a
commitment to a mental hospital, but also actually may be hostile to
that conclusion. Baxstrom had been convicted and sentenced to prison
in the State of New York. While serving his term, he was "certified as
insane by a prison physician"45 and transferred to Dannemora State
Hospital, a psychiatric facility maintained by the Department of Cor-
rection for the confinement of mentally ill prisoners and civilly com-
mitted "dangerous" persons.46 A statutory procedure was invoked to
effect his indefinite civil commitment.47 Baxstrom's commitment was
42. 445 U.S. at 493.
43. See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
44. 383 U.S. 107 (1966).
45. Id. at 108.
46. Id. at 113.
47. Id. at 108-09.
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distinguishable from the usual civil commitment procedure in two im-
portant respects: First, a person committed at the end of a penal sen-
tence did not have the right, available to all other persons civilly
committed, to jury review of the decision that he or she was mentally ill
and in need of hospitalization; second, this person could be held at
Dannemora without the judicial determination of dangerousness,
which was required in connection with other civil commitments to that
institution.48 The Supreme Court held that the commitment procedure
violated the equal protection clause by denying to Baxstrom the jury
review available to other committed persons.
The director contends that the State has created a reasonable classifica-
tion differentiating the civilly insane from the "criminally insane," which
he defines as those with dangerous or criminal propensities. Equal pro-
tection does not require that all persons be dealt with identically, but it
does require that a distinction made have some relevance to the purpose
for which the classification is made. Classification of mentally ill persons
as either insane or dangerously insane of course may be a reasonable dis-
tinction for purposes of determining the type of custodial or medical care
to be given, but it has no relevance whatever in the context of the oppor-
tunity to show whether a person is mentally ill at all. For purposes of
granting judicial review before a jury of the question whether a person is
mentally ill and in need of institutionalization, there is no conceivable
basis for distinguishing the commitment of a person who is nearing the
end of a penal term from all other civil commitments.49
A crucial distinction between Baxstrom and Vitek v. Jones is that the
state in Baxstrom sought to justify relaxed procedures for a civil com-
mitment, concededly distinct from the criminal sentence, by reference
to a past conviction. In Vtek the state asserted that a transfer to a
mental hospital was not a distinct civil commitment, but merely a con-
sequence authorized by a then operative criminal sentence. The valid-
ity of the original transfer of the prisoner to the mental hospital was not
an issue in Baxstrom. Arguably, the case presumes the original trans-
fer to have been valid for the duration of the criminal sentence.
Justice White also relied on Specht v. Patterson,"0 which required
procedural safeguards to commit an individual under the Colorado Sex
Offenders Act who had been convicted of a qualifying sexual offense.
In Specht the criminal conviction standing alone did not authorize psy-
48. Id. at 110-13.
49. Id. at 111-12 (emphasis in original).
50. 386 U.S. 605 (1967).
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chiatric intervention under state law. A criminal statute wholly distinct
from the Sexual Offenders Act defined the sexual offense. 1 New fac-
tual determinations not pertinent to the criminal conviction had to be
made to apply the Sexual Offenders Act. 2 In Specht the Court merely
held that if a state statute authorized the commitment of a person who
had been convicted of a specified kind of offense and who met certain
other criteria, due process required standard procedural safeguards not
only in the finding that the individual was guilty of the offense, but also
concerning the determination that the additional facts existed which
were statutorily required for commitment. 3 Specht is not authority for
the proposition that some constitutional principle requires a state to
maintain the traditional distinction between the consequences of a
criminal sentence and those of a civil commitment. The Sex Offenders
Act itself already honored the distinction.
The third case that Justice White relied on is Humphrey v. Cady.54
By writ of habeas corpus, the petitioner challenged his commitment
under the Wisconsin Sex Crimes Act, which provided for commitment
in place of a prison sentence for persons convicted of any crime "prob-
ably directly motivated by a desire for sexual excitement. ' 55 The initial
duration of the commitment was identical to the maximum sentence
authorized for the crime, but the statute permitted additional five-year
renewals on a judicial determination that the inmate's discharge would
be "dangerous to the public because of mental or physical deficiency,
disorders or abnormality."56 One of the principal grounds for the peti-
tioner's challenge to the procedure surrounding both the original and
renewal commitments was that the Sex Crimes Act allowed commit-
ment without the right to a jury trial, a right available to other persons
civilly committed in Wisconsin.57 The federal district court, without
holding an evidentiary hearing, dismissed the petition both on the mer-
its of the claims and on procedural grounds s.5  The court of appeals
refused to certify probable cause for an appeal solely because the
claims were without merit.5 9 The Supreme Court, relying on Baxstrom
51. Id. at 607.
52. Id. at 607-08.
53. Id. at 610.
54. 405 U.S. 504 (1972).
55. Id. at 507.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 508.
58. Id. at 506.
59. Id.
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v. Herold6" and Specht v. Patterson," remanded the case to the district
court for an evidentiary hearing. Because the Supreme Court did not
resolve the merits of the claims but merely held that they were "at least
substantial enough to warrant an evidentiary hearing,"6 2 the case does
not add to the implications of Baxstrom and Specht. Moreover, the
Court suggested a critical distinction between a case in which the state
utilizes psychiatric intervention in place of traditional penal incarcera-
tion as the sanction for a crime, and a case in which the state uses a
criminal conviction as a basis for a commitment which is not character-
ized by the state as a criminal sanction.
Respondent seeks to justify the discrimination on the ground that com-
mitment under the Sex Crimes Act is triggered by a criminal conviction;
that such commitment is merely an alternative to penal sentencing; and
consequently that it does not require the same procedural safeguards af-
forded in a civil commitment proceeding. That argument arguably has
force with respect to an initial commitment under the Sex Crimes Act, which
is imposed in lieu of sentence, and is limited in duration to the maximum
permissible sentence. The argument can carry little weight, however, with
respect to the subsequent renewal proceedings, which result in five-year
commitment orders based on new findings of fact, and are in no way lim-
ited by the nature of the defendant's crime or the maximum sentence au-
thorized for that crime. The renewal orders bear substantial resemblance
to the post-sentence commitment that was at issue in Baxstrom. More-
over, the Wisconsin Supreme Court has expressly held that even the ini-
tial commitment under the Sex Crimes Act is not simply a sentencing
alternative, but rather an independent commitment for treatment, compa-
rable to commitment under the Mental Health Act.63
Thus, contrary to the suggestion of Vitek v. Jones, Humphrey
reserves the possibility that a state may freely substitute involuntary
psychiatric or behavioral programs for the traditional penal sentence.'
Finally, Justice White relied on Jackson v. Indiana,61 which articu-
lated the constitutional limitations on the power of the state to confine
a person charged with a crime and found incompetent to stand trial.
The Jackson Court first held that the equal protection clause, as ap-
plied in Baxstrom v. Herold, precluded the state from making arbitrary
60. 383 U.S. 107 (1966).
61. 386 U.S. 605 (1967).
62. 405 U.S. at 508.
63. Id. at 5 10-11 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
64. See id.
65. 406 U.S. 715 (1972).
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distinctions between procedures and standards for commitment and
discharge of incompetent defendants and those applicable to all other
persons civilly committed.66 The Court's second holding, which is pre-
mised on the due process clause, significantly states that:
[A] person charged by a State with a criminal offense who is committed
solely on account of his incapacity to proceed to trial cannot be held more
than the reasonable period of time necessary to determine whether there
is a substantial probability that he will attain that capacity in the foresee-
able future. If it is determined that this is not the case, then the State
must either institute the customary civil commitment proceeding that
would be required to commit indefinitely any other citizen, or release the
defendant. Furthermore, even if it is determined that the defendant prob-
ably will be able to stand trial, his continued commitment must be justi-
fied by progress toward that goal.67
The Jackson Court recognized three traditional bases for psychiatric
intervention in the form of commitment to a mental hospital:
"[DIangerousness to self, dangerousness to others, and need for care or
treatment or training." 68 The Court also acknowledged that "the sub-
stantive constitutional limitation on this power" remained largely un-
resolved.69 The Court in Jackson did not deal with "these broad
questions" concerning the civil commitment power.7 0 A narrow ration-
ale for the holding is stated succinctly: "At the least, due process, re-
quires that the nature and duration of commitment bear some
reasonable relation to the purpose for which the individual is commit-
ted."' 71 That proposition is relevant as a general legal principle to the
issue presented in Vitek v. Jones. This principle ultimately may help to
supply the necessary link between constitutional theory and the tradi-
tional distinction between a prison sentence and a civil commitment.
Except for the potential relevance of the general principle of Jackson
v. Indiana, however, the case is not authority for the holding in Vitek v.
Jones. Theon Jackson, unlike Larry Jones, had not been convicted of a
crime. Jackson thus did not involve a criminal sentence that the state
might rely on to authorize the psychiatric intervention. The state of
Indiana also did not have any other justification for the "nature and
66. Id. at 723-30.
67. Id. at 738 (footnote omitted).
68. Id. at 737 (footnote omitted).
69. Id. at 736-37.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 738.
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duration" of the proposed commitment. Jackson v. Indiana would
have been an appropriate starting point for the analysis in Vtek v.
Jones. Jackson was not, however, adequate as the controlling author-
ity for the resolution of Vitek.
Thus, without developing or identifying any determinative legal the-
ory, the Court in Vitek v. Jones held that the Constitution forbids a
state from treating a criminal conviction as a sufficient basis for the
offender's confinement and treatment in a psychiatric facility as a men-
tally ill person. The precise holding of the case may be limited to fac-
tual situations involving a determination that the prisoner is mentally
ill, coupled with physical transfer for psychiatric treatment to a facility
not under the jurisdiction of the correctional authority. The rationale
of the case, however, does not justify this narrow reading. The Court
held that finding a prisoner to be mentally ill and subjecting the person
to involuntary psychiatric hospitalization is "qualitatively different" 72
from traditional punishment. Consider whether the following prac-
tices, which do in fact occur in modem correctional settings,73 are not
equally different in kind from the standard case of the penal sanction.
1. The defendant is sentenced to a three year prison term. After a
year of incarceration in a traditional prison setting, the individual be-
gins to exhibit bizarre behavior. The defendant is examined without
consent by a psychiatrist, and administratively reassigned on the basis
of the psychiatric report to a combined medical/psychiatric facility
under the jurisdiction of the Department of Corrections. The defend-
ant is placed, again without consent, in a program in which he or she is
administered psychotropic drugs and subjected to daily therapeutic
programs identical to those followed in many ordinary civil mental
hospitals, and completely unlike traditional prison routines. Physi-
cians, psychologists, psychiatric nurses, and social workers constitute
the majority of the professional staff. The inmates are officially denom-
inated patients rather than prisoners; the living units are called wards,
not cellblocks; and the buildings and grounds are designated a hospital,
not a penitentiary. Inmates who have not been administratively re-
transferred to a traditional setting by the expiration of their prison term
either must be discharged or committed to a civil hospital in the usual
way.
74
72. 445 U.S. at 493.
73. See generally R.K. ScHwrrzEBEL, supra note 3.
74. 18 U.S.C. § 4241 (1976) creates a board of examiners for each federal penal institution.
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2. A prisoner mutilates herself one night when alone in a cell. She
is taken for emergency treatment to the prison infirmary. The next
morning the prison psychiatrist interviews the woman and enters in the
infirmary records a diagnosis of a mental disorder. The psychiatrist
orders drug therapy and intensive monitoring of the prisoner's behav-
ior. The prison classification committee reassigns her without her con-
sent from her former cellblock to the prison's psychiatric care unit
located in a portion of the infirmary." Prisoners assigned to this unit
are not allowed to work outside the unit and are always isolated from
the general prison population. Meals are taken in the infirmary and a
recreation period separate from that of the general population is pro-
vided. The prisoners in the psychiatric unit are not allowed to partici-
pate in the generally available programs and activities of the prison.
The prisoners follow a daily routine, which is more rigid and restricted
than that designated for the general population. Nurses chart the daily
behavior of each prisoner and require each prisoner to participate in
two weekly group therapy sessions. Although general prison program-
uing is determined by a central administrative committee composed of
correctional and counseling staff, the program in the psychiatric unit is
under the direct control of the prison psychiatrist and his or her staff.
Only a staff physician or psychologist may assign a prisoner to the psy-
chiatric unit or release the prisoner from the unit.
3. A long term prisoner begins to display symptoms of delusion and
depression. He is interviewed by the prison psychiatrist who prescribes
a daily administration of an antidepressant drug.76 The prisoner ob-
jects to the therapy, but accepts it under threat of disciplinary action.
The board is authorized to "examine any inmate of the institution alleged to be insane or of
unsound mind or otherwise defective. Upon receiving a report from the board concerning
an inmate, the Attorney General,
may direct the. . . official having custody of the prisoner to cause such prisoner to be
removed to the United States hospital for defective delinquents. . . there to be kept
until, in the judgment of the superintendent of said hospital, the prisoner shall be re-
stored to sanity or health or until the maximum sentence, without deduction for good
time or commutation of sentence, shall have been served.
Under § 4241 federal prisoners frequently have been transferred to the Medical Center for Fed-
eral Prisoners at Springfield, Missouri, which is not a civil mental hospital, but a federal correc-
tional facility under the authority of the Attorney General and similar in many respects to the
kind of institution described in the text. See generally Garcia v. Steele, 193 F.2d 276 (8th Cir.
1951).
75. During a period of time throughout the course of the Vitek v. Jones litigation, Larry
Jones was in such a unit at the Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex. Brief for Appellee at
11-12, Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980).
76. Cf. Peek v. Ciccone, 288 F. Supp. 329 (W.D. Mo. 1968) (forced administration of tran-
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4. A correctional facility for young and first time felons maintains
two distinct programs. The Attorney General, who receives initial cus-
tody of all convicted felons, routinely assigns to the facility all male
offenders in the state who are either between the ages of nineteen and
twenty-six, or who have never served time for a felony conviction. The
Attorney General's orders do not specify a particular program for an
offender, but only the place of confinement.
Each prisoner on arrival at the facility is assigned to the Reception
and Diagnostic Unit (R & D Unit) where he undergoes a three week
period of orientation, testing, and evaluation. The director of the unit
is a psychologist. Near the end of the three week period, the diagnostic
staff prepares a detailed report and recommendation for the classifica-
tion committee, composed of the warden, the R & D Unit director, and
the deputy programming warden. This committee decides to assign the
prisoner into one of the two programs. Under one program, the pris-
oner will join a work crew, which performs institutional service for a
four hour period six-days-a-week (e.g., laundry, kitchen, or grounds
maintenance). Another four hours of the prisoner's day are devoted to
educational or vocational training. The remaining time of each day is
divided between lock-up in a two-man cell, a recreation period in the
prison yard or gym, and routine activities (e.g, meals, sick call, and
visiting time).
If the prisoner is assigned to the second program, he will participate
in a twenty-four-hour-a-day, seven-day-a-week token economy pro-
gram designed and implemented by a staff of psychologists and profes-
sionally trained counselors." During the first stage of the program the
prisoner lives in a large simple dormitory, works ten hours per day, and
performs menial institutional tasks (e.g., garbage collection, cutting
weeds). Every day the prisoner and staff combine to complete a written
behavior inventory. At the end of each day, the staff rewards the pris-
oner with tokens for behavior which the staff has pre-identified as ap-
propriate. Under certain circumstances the prisoner will be charged
tokens for disapproved behavior. The prisoner can exchange the to-
kens or certain items or privileges. At the end of four weeks, the pris-
oner may use the tokens to buy his way into the next stage of the
quilizer to federal prisoner as part of treatment for mental disorder held not to constitute cruel
and unusual punishment).
77. Cf. Clonce v. Richardson, 379 F. Supp. 338 (W.D. Mo. 1974) (challenge by federal pris-
oners to START (Special Treatment and Rehabilitative Training), a behavior modification pro-
gram utilizing a progressive tier system).
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program if he has accumulated the required number of tokens. Each
successive stage involves improved work or training assignments and
more comfortable living quarters. If a prisoner works his way into the
penultimate stage of the program, he lives in a private room of a small
cottage with three or four other inmates, and enjoys a job that pays real
money, many opportunities for training and self-betterment programs,
and regular furloughs. The final stage of the program is conditional
release into the community. The program has been designed in accord-
ance with behavior modification principles, and is intended to increase
the frequency of designated approved behavior and decrease the fre-
quency of designated disapproved behavior displayed by the pris-
oner.
78
Possible variations on these themes are almost infinite.79 A parole
board may "suggest" to a candidate for parole that he or she enroll in
the prison's alchoholic treatment program. An inmate may be directed
to pay weekly visits to the psychologist or to participate in a group
therapy program. A court may order a probationer to report weekly to
a mental health clinic or to remain under the supervision of a mental
health professional.
Is it not the case that to some degree all of these hypothetical situa-
tions involve the use of coercive behavioral interventions, which are
"qualitatively different from the punishment characteristically suffered
by a person convicted of a crime?" 0 Vitek v. Jones leaves open to spec-
ulation the probable outcome of challenges to practices similar to the
suggested ones. The Vitek opinion simply does not give sufficient in-
sight into its rationale to permit confident prediction. The broad ques-
78. For discussion of applications to criminal law of psychological principles in general, in-
cluding behavior modification principles, see Singer, Psychological Studies of Punishment, 59
CALIF. L. REV. 405 (1970).
79. Many variations are suggested in R.K. ScHwrrzGEBEL, supra note 3. Extreme examples
of the coercive use of highly intrusive behavioral control techniques have occurred recently. See
e.g., Knecht v. Gillman, 488 F.2d 1136 (8th Cir. 1973) (enjoining as cruel and unusual punish-
ment the involuntary treatment of inmates in a program of "behavior modification by aversive
stimuli," id. at 1138, in which inmates whose behavior was disapproved received an intra-muscu-
lar injection of apomorphine, a drug which induced a period of vomiting lasting from fifteen
minutes to one hour); Mackey v. Procunier, 477 F.2d 877 (9th Cir. 1973) (allegation that as part of
an experimental aversive conditioning program a prisoner coercively was given succinycholine, a
drug which produces temporary paralysis and inability to breathe and which is normally used as a
relaxant not to be administered to fully conscious patients). See also Note, Conditioning and Other
Technologies Used to "Treat?" 'Rehabilitate?" "Demolish?" Prisoners and Mental Patients, 45
CALIF. L. REv. 616 (1972).
80. 445 U.S. at 493.
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tion raised by the hypothetical practices is an important one: To what
extent may the state ever include involuntary psychiatric treatment or
other coercive behavioral interventions among the actual ordinary con-
sequences of a criminal conviction and sentence? As illustrated above,
these interventions are not foreign to contemporary correctional pro-
grams.81
II. SUBSTANTIVE LIMITATIONS ON THE USE OF COERCIVE
BEHAVIORAL INTERVENTIONS
A. Introduction
Notwithstanding the unsatisfactory analysis in Vitek v. Jones, it does
seem that important limitations on the power of the state to introduce
involuntary psychiatric and behavioral techniques into the system of
criminal sanctions may be anticipated. Moreover, this seems to be the
case precisely because the practices are "qualitatively different" from
the standard instances of criminal punishment. Although Justice
White's discussion may fail to disclose an adequate constitutional the-
ory, his reaction against the unregulated power of the state to commit
its prisoners to mental hospitals has intuitive appeal as a matter of
criminal law policy. It also may be possible to identify principles
which can elevate that intuition to constitutional stature. A more sensi-
ble approach, however, begins by exploring the intuition itself, which is
related more to the premises underlying our criminal law than to the
United States Constitution.
At the core of the objection to the use of behavioral techniques is a
judgment that coercive efforts to cure, treat, or modify the mental or
behavioral make-up of the criminal are not within the usual meaning
of "punishment" in the context of the criminal law. The criminal law
generally is viewed as a social structure designed to enforce specific
behavioral norms through the official identification and punishment of
violators. The feeling that the transfer of a prisoner from a prison to a
mental hospital for treatment, and perhaps many other uses of behav-
ioral technology in corrections as well, cannot be viewed simply as an
administrative maneuver within the scope of the criminal sanction re-
flects the common understanding of the meaning of criminal punish-
ment. What is that common understanding? H.L.A. Hart has offered a
most appealing statement, which he calls the standard or central case of
81. See notes 73-79 supra.
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punishment.82
Hart does not mean to identify any universal or necessary definition
of punishment by this phrase, but rather to specify the elements that are
crucial to the comprehension of the concept within the context of crimi-
nal law. There are five crucial elements:
(i) Punishment must involve pain or other consequences normally
considered unpleasant.
(ii) Punishment must be for an offense against legal rules.
(iii) It must be of an actual or supposed offender for his offense.
(iv) It must be intentionally administered by human beings other than
the offender.
(v) It must be imposed and administered by an authority constituted by
a legal system against which the offense is committed. 3
Using these guidelines, or some equally precise statement of our
common understanding, we can consider whether particular instances
of psychiatric or behavioral interventions are within the standard case
of punishment.84 We probably would conclude that many coercive ap-
plications of psychiatric and behavior technology to criminal offenders
are not punishment in the usual sense. Those judgments might help to
clarify the "qualitative difference" found critical in Vitek v. Jones.
They would not conclude our analysis, however, of when psychiatric
treatment or other behavioral interventions are appropriate aspects of
the criminal sanction because ultimately the question is not one of defi-
nition (te., what consequences are punishment?), but rather ofjustifica-
tion (le., what consequences are morally right responses to crime?).
Thus, many uses of psychiatric interventions by prison authorities are
not punishment in the usual sense precisely because they are not im-
posed on the prisoner for an offense, but rather are responses to the
perceived needs of a person who also is a prisoner.8 5 The first three of
the above hypothetical situations involve psychiatric treatment of this
82. H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND REsPONSIBILrrY 4, 6 (1968).
83. H.L.A. HART, supra note 82, at 4-5.
84. Other formulations of the common understanding may differ in significant respects from
Hart's, and might well affect the analysis suggested in this Article. Hart's work enjoys sufficient
recognition, however, to justify its use in constructing a framework which is essential before any
thoughtful conclusions can be finally reached concerning the appropriate use of behavioral inter-
ventions as ordinary components of the criminal sanctioning system. See G. NEWMAN, THE PUN-
ISHMENT RESPONSE 7-11 (1978).
85. One might also argue that many behavioral interventions are not punishment because
they do not "involve pain or other consequences normally considered unpleasant." Such an ob-
jection seems strained because we are concerned only with interventions to which the offender has
not consented.
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kind. Some interventions, for example the behavior modification pro-
gram of the fourth hypothetical case, and many less intrusive self-bet-
terment programs imposed in varying degrees on many prisoners, ar-
guably do fit within the standard case of punishment.
This would not mean, however, that the state ought to be free to
utilize the latter type, but not the former. Why should not the state be
permitted to broaden the consequences of a criminal sentence beyond
the traditional concept by redefining, through its statutes or through
particular sentences themselves, the common understanding of the
criminal sanction? Alternatively, why must we accept the propriety of
some psychiatric interventions, but not others, simply because some fall
literally within the accepted definition of "punishment?" Perhaps re-
flection on the implications of these practices might lead to a redefini-
tion of the core concept to exclude some or all of the practices. After
all, modern psychiatric and behavioral technologies were unknown
when our concept of criminal punishment became standardized. As
Professor Hart makes clear, specifying a definition of the standard case
of punishment does not settle, but rather highlights, the ultimate issue.
Why do we prefer this [punishment in the usual sense] to other forms of
social hygiene which we might employ to prevent anti-social behavior
and which we do employ in special circumstances, sometimes with reluc-
tance? No account of punishment can afford to dismiss this question with
a definition.
8 6
In summary, the intuitive reaction that some coercive behavioral in-
terventions cannot be tolerated simply as permissible consequences of a
criminal conviction and sentence may be explicated as a reflection of
what is normally understood by "punishment." Whether or not any
particular intervention falls inside or outside the accepted punishment
concept, its availability within the criminal sanctioning system ought to
depend on a justificatory analysis. It was this type of analysis that was
missing in Vitek v. Jones.
Criminal sanctions in general typically are justified through philo-
sophical defenses of the practice of punishment. These justifications
are embedded in the traditions of criminal law theory. Students of the
criminal law are familiar with the perennial debates concerning the
theories that purport to give the criminal sanction its moral authority.
The terms "retribution," "rehabilitation," "reform," and "deterrence"
come to mind most readily as the trademarks of competing argu-
86. H.L.A. HART, supra note 82, at 6.
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ments8 7 A related but distinct validating process is required when the
forum for passing judgment on a criminal sanction is federal constitu-
tional litigation."8 The critical distinction between the criminal and
constitutional justification processes is that although constitutional ar-
guments are circumscribed by current Supreme Court construction of
the Constitution, criminal law theory is responsive to a wider range of
philosophic arguments within the context of the Anglo-American crim-
inal law development, which predates our written Constitution by hun-
dreds of years.
The following analysis is a brief excursion into the justification ques-
tion, both in its criminal and constitutional law embodiments. This
analysis is essential before any satisfactory response is made to the
proposition that the state may sometimes utilize involuntary psychiatric
treatment or other behavioral interventions as ordinary aspects of the
criminal sanction. The issue at stake is more immediately important as
a matter of criminal law theory than of constitutional law. Thus, pri-
mary attention will be paid to the former concern.
B. Limitations Derived From Criminal Law Theory
To derive limitations on the use of behavioral interventions as crimi-
nal sanctions from criminal law theory, it is necessary to begin with a
clear notion of those aspects of criminal law theory that are directly
concerned with the justifications for criminal sanctions. More than one
viable analysis of criminal law theory, however, may be identified.
Rather than attempting to juggle all the competing principles, which
might be suggested as relevant after a comprehensive survey of crimi-
nal law theory, the current discussion relies on contemporary analyses
of criminal law theory that embody principles which seem to enjoy
great common acceptance."9 Two components of those analyses are
87. See, ag., A. EwiNo, THE MoRALrry OF PUNISHMENT (1929); H.L.A. HART, supra note
82, at 1-27; S. KADISH & M. PAULSEN, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES 1-33 (3d ed. 1975); H.
PACKER, THE LIMrrS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 35-61 (1968); Cohen, Moral Aspects of the
Criminal Law, 49 YALE L.J. 987 (1940).
88. See Part II C infra.
89. The discussion of underlying principles draws most heavily from the following works
from the mainstream of the contemporary literature on the subject: J. HALL, GENERAL PRINCI-
PLES OF CRIMINAL LAW (2d ed. 1960); H.L.A. HART, supra note 82; S. KADIsH & M. PAULSEN,
supra note 87; W. LAFAVE & A. SCorr, JR., HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW (1972); H. PACKER,
upra note 87; L. WEINREB, CRIMINAL LAW (3d ed. 1980). There is, however, no universally
accepted analysis of criminal law. Compare J. HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW
(2d ed. 1960) with G. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRITMNAL LAW (1978). The particular analysis on
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clearly critical to the justification of a criminal sanction.9° The first
involves the criminal law's view of the nature of human behavior. The
second concerns the philosophical approach to be employed in deter-
mining whether a formal response to criminality is justified.
The first component entails a well-defined philosophical view of the
nature of human behavior. Under that view, absent unusual circum-
stances, an individual actor presumably possesses a significant capacity
to appreciate the circumstances under which he or she acts and the
probable consequences of a course of action. Furthermore, the individ-
ual presumably knows and selects from among alternative courses of
action.91 The necessary conclusion is that the individual is an autono-
mous being, and thus is responsible for his or her conduct. The indi-
vidual is both deserving of praise for good acts and blame for bad ones.
This underlying concept of human action may be called the responsible
agent doctrine.92
Most of the traditional justifications for criminal punishment appar-
ently adopt this view of the nature of human action. Indeed, this view
contributes to the need for a justifying theory. In the first place, be-
cause human beings are dignified, free creatures, the punishment of
them without good cause would be wrong. Moreover, to punish some-
one for violating a specified social norm would be patently immoral,
but for the fact that the actor is responsible for the behavior because he
or she could have done otherwise.
The second and more complex component of the analysis is con-
cerned with articulating specific arguments to justify criminal sanc-
tions. The traditional theories for justifying the criminal sanction are
well known to all students of criminal law theory.93 The task of justify-
ing official responses to criminality, however, entails a complexity
which one settles inevitably will affect profoundly one's conclusions concerning the proper role of
coercive behavioral interventions in the criminal justice system. The analyses relied on in the text
serve merely as models to aid in construction of an approach to the problem.
90. While other aspects of contemporary theories may also be relevant, they need not be
considered for the limited purposes of this article.
91. See, e.g., H.L.A. HART, supra note 82, at 28-53, 158-85; Kadish, The Decline of Inno-
cence, 26 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 273 (1968). See generally THE NATURE OF HUMAN ACTION (M. Brand
ed. 1970).
92. See generally Kadish, supra note 91, at 273, 287. For an in-depth commentary on the
underlying distinctions between the legal and scientific perspectives on human behavior, see
Morse, Crazy Behavior, Morals, and Science: An Anaysi ofMental Health Law, 51 S. CAL. L.
REv. 527 (1978).
93. See note 87 supra.
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which is frequently overlooked as H.L.A. Hart recognizes in his collec-
tion of essays, Punishment and Responsibiity.94 In evaluating the pro-
priety of resort to psychiatric and behavioral interventions, not only
may distinct philosophical theories concerning justification exist (e.g.,
utilitarian versus retributive theories), but also distinct kinds of ques-
tions about justification can be raised. On the one hand, we must con-
sider the implications of the competing theories concerning the
justification for imposing any consequences on criminals. These theo-
ries involve what Hart calls questions of general justifying aim.9 5 Val-
ues, which operate as limitations on whether a specific consequence
may be imposed on a particular individual in a given case, must also be
taken into account. These are considerations involving what Hart calls
questions of distribution, or distributive justice. A convincing argu-
ment may exist to justify the general practice of imposing sanctions on
criminals. Yet the argument may neither establish that it is proper to
execute each individual who is correctly identified as a criminal, nor
will it necessarily show the justice of any other specific response to a
particular criminal act and actor.
It is sufficient to consider the competing theories of general justifica-
tion as stemming from either of two lines.96 One line simply asserts
that if the conduct of a responsible actor is criminal, punishment is not
an evil, but is morally proper.97 This may be identified as the retribu-
tive justification of punishment. The other line is based in utilitarian
ethics. The utilitarian justifications assert that punishment is always an
evil, which can be justified only if a countervailing utility is served.
Principles of distribution are at least as significant for our purposes
as the more frequently examined principles of general justification.
The chief relevant considerations, which stem from theories of distribu-
tive justice, relate to the proportionality limitation.98 Distributive jus-
94. H.L.A. HART, supra note 82, at 3-13.
95. H.L.A. HART, supra note 82, at 4.
96 Seegenerally, H.L.A. HART, supra note 82; H. PACKER, supra note 87, at 35-61; L. WEIN-
REB, supra note 89, at 617-34. Professor Hart, while recognizing the retributive line, takes the
position that the claims which comprise this line "all either avoid the question of justification
altogether or are in spite of their protestations disguised forms of Utilitarianism . H.L.A.
HART, supra note 82, at 9. See also THEORIES OF PUNISHMENT (S. Grupp ed. 1971).
97. See, e.g., G. HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT (T. Knox transl. 1942); I. KANT, THE META-
PHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE (J. Ladd transL 1965).
98. The concept of proportionality itself is too complex to be categorized accurately as be-
longing solely to the principles of general justification or distributive justice. The most doctrinaire
retributivist might argue that there can be no general justification for the practice of imposing
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tice theories also may be contrasted as either retributive or utilitarian,
and the proportionality concept itself has both retributive and utilita-
rian applications. For example, even if it is justifiable to punish an
individual for an offense, notions of proportionality may be invoked to
argue that a therapeutic sanction may be utilized only if, (1) the sanc-
tion is consonant with the retributive tenet that the punishment must fit
the crime, or (2) the social benefits associated with the sanction out-
weigh the costs. In contemporary sentencing theory the principle of
proportionality, whether on a retributive or utilitarian basis, gives rise
to a principle that the nature of the punishment must be rationally re-
lated to the seriousness of the offense and must fit reasonably into a
comprehensive scheme of graduated punishments for offenses of vary-
ing degrees of wickedness.99
Arguments about the propriety of including involuntary behavioral
interventions within the arsenal of authorized criminal consequences
should focus on the relationship of these practices to the theoretical
foundations of contemporary criminal law analysis. If the practices
cannot be assimilated coherently into the analysis, then either the anal-
ysis must be altered or the practices rejected.l °°
In testing the use of behavioral interventions against the theoretical
analysis, one must initially consider whether the imposition of psychi-
atric treatment or other forms of behavioral therapy as a normal conse-
quence of a criminal conviction is consistent with the responsible agent
doctrine. Incorporation of psychiatric treatment or other behavioral in-
terventions into the post-conviction branch of the criminal law cer-
tainly does not require a total and explicit rejection of the view that
human action is generally the product of the actor's choice. There is,
however, an implicit rejection of any fundamentalist position that
humans must, or at least should, always be regarded as responsible for
their behavior. Until conviction, the offender is capable of determining
therapeutic consequences on a criminal because the pain of such consequences never equals in
kind or degree the evil done by a crime, and at least some utilitarians may argue that the costs
incurred by the use of such consequences (or at least by some specific therapies) always outweigh
their benefits.
99. With respect to the proportionality principle generally in criminal theory, see H.L.A.
HART, supra note 82, at 161-73; S. KADISH & M. PAULSEN, supra note 87, at 157-67; H. PACKER,
supra note 87, at 139-45.
100. As previously noted, a theorist is not bound to accept the philosophical foundations set
out in the text. See note 89 supra. But even if a different set of foundations is posited, the method
of analysis concerning the propriety of behavioral interventions is essentially the same. One must
be concerned to know whether such consequences fit the theory one hypothesizes.
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his or her own course of action. Thus the principles of criminal liabil-
ity, which are the core principles of criminal law theory, are not altered
by the introduction of behavioral interventions into the system of crim-
inal sanctions. After conviction, however, that capacity is modified and
thus denied. The offender is not merely deprived of some of those al-
ternative courses of action, which would be present outside a prison,
but his or her own free will to some greater or lesser extent is destroyed
through the use of techniques designed to allow future behavior to be
determined by factors not within his or her control. Initially, this im-
plies that individual autonomy and responsibility can exist only in a
relative sense; otherwise no such manipulation of behavior would be
possible. Second, there is no absolute sanctity of individual autonomy,
or else such manipulation would be morally intolerable even when the
subject is a wrongdoer.
Consider the following comments directed against reform theories of
criminal sanctions in general:
It is often thought that . . . the reform theory is modem and humane
compared with the retributive theory, which is primitive and barbaric.
But the essential point about retributive punishment is that it treats the
criminal as a man. A law is not, as the determinists would hold, a partic-
ular kind of cause (on a level with a drug or hypnosis or psychiatric treat-
ment). It is not a cause at all, because it presents a choice and assumes
freedom and responsibility. Retribution is the agent's own act. The law
can threaten; but there is only one thing that can justify a punishment and
that is something the legislator cannot bring about, namely, a free choice
by the subject .... To be punished for reform reasons is to be treated
like a dog. A sane adult demands to be held responsible for his actions.
He rejects as an intolerable insult the well-meaning exculpations of the
sympathetic scientist, whether presented on social or psychological
grounds. Retributive punishment closes the account, reformative punish-
ment opens it .... '0o
Currently, the responsible agent doctrine is not likely to be advanced
to this extreme position. Contemporary criminal law theories undoubt-
edly can accommodate some incorporation of the behavioral sciences
and their philosophical underpinnings. If the responsible agent doc-
trine is to enjoy its traditional level of influence concerning questions of
criminal liability, however, there will be some conceptual inconsistency
associated with significant abdication of control over the criminal law
101. Mabbot, Freewill and Punishment, in CONTEMPORARY BRITISH PHILOSOPHY, THIRD SE-
RIES 289, 303 (H. Lewis ed. 1956).
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to the disciples of scientific determinism. The vigorous and continuing
debate over certain concrete proposals to integrate contemporary be-
havioral science theories into the criminal law illustrates this point
most vividly. The proposals have taken many forms. °2 One of the
most radical is frequently attributed to the contemporary British crimi-
nologist, Lady Barbara Wootton.'0 3 Relying on the proposition that
the object of criminal law is prevention rather than punishment of
harmful behavior, the proponents of this theory would divide the sanc-
tioning process into two distinct operations.1° The first would concern
itself solely with the factual question of whether the accused caused the
harm defined by a legislative prohibition. Traditional criminal intent
questions would not be relevant to this preliminary inquiry. If it were
determined that the person had caused the proscribed harm, a second,
dispositional stage would occur to investigate the appropriate response
to the harmful conduct. According to one related proposal, at least
four dispositional alternatives should be available in every case without
regard to traditional sentencing notions: Release the individual with
no further intervention, punish the individual, merely confine for pre-
ventive purposes, or provide treatment services for the person.'0 5 Un-
102. Some, influenced by deterministic notions concerning the causes of criminality, have
called for the elimination of the insanity defense with the result that a person deemed not crimi-
nally responsible under present standards because of mental disease or defect would be liable to
conviction. Following conviction, evidence concerning the mental condition of the person would
be considered in light of contemporary behavioral science theories in connection with the proper
disposition of the offender. See, e.g., Morris, Psychiatry andthe Dangerous Criminal, 41 S. CAL. L.
REV. 514 (1968); Weintraub, Criminal Responsibility: Psychiatry lone Cannot Determine ft, 49
A.B.A.J. 1075 (1963). Cf. NEW YORK STATE DEP'T OF MENTAL HYGIENE, THE INSANITY DE-
FENSE IN NEW YORK (1978) (recommending substitution of a rule of diminished capacity for the
traditional insanity defense). On a more abstract level it has been suggested that the distinction
we presently make between the punishment of criminals and the treatment of mentally disabled
persons might best be discarded in favor of "an integrated theory of social sanctions... sub-
suming criminal and mental health law under a common and consistent set of principles."
Monahan, Social Accountability Preface to an Integrated Theory of Criminal and Mental Health
Sanctions, in I PERSPECTIVES IN LAW AND PSYCHOLOGY: THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 241-55
(1977).
103. See Kadish, supra note 91, at 273; Morris, supra note 102, at 514.
104. See B. WOOTTON, CRIME AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 52-53 (1963). See also J. MARSHALL,
INTENTION-IN LAW AND SOCIETY 187-97 (1968); Campbell, A Strict Accountability Approach to
Criminal Responsibility, FED. PROB., Dec. 1965, at 33.
105. See Waelder, Psychiatry and the Problem of Criminal Responsibility, 101 U. PA. L. REV.
378 (1952). According to Wadder, a psychoanalyst, punishment is appropriate if the offender is
found to be deterrable, preventive custody if he or she is dangerous, treatment if he or she is
treatable. In some cases more than one of those three alternatives will be proper, in others only
release will be appropriate. Id. at 389-90.
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derlying all these proposals, and at least to some extent the
contemporary rehabilitation model of corrections, is the notion that a
traditional criminal conviction is not only an authorization for the im-
position of punishment, but also therapy for the offender.
The response of Professor Sanford Kadish to the Wootton proposal
is both a reminder that the responsible agent doctrine does have current
vitality and a warning that there are serious reasons to scrutinize any
proposal which threatens the doctrine.
Much of our commitment to the democratic values, to human dignity and
self-determination, to the value of the individual, turns on the pivot of a
view of man as a responsible agent entitled to be praised or blamed de-
pending upon his free choice of conduct. A view of men "merely as alter-
able, predictable, curable or manipulatable things" is the foundation of a
very different social order indeed. The ancient notion of free will may
well in substantial measure be a myth. But even a convinced determinist
should reject a government regime which is founded on anything less in
its system of authoritative disposition of citizens. Whether the concept of
man as responsible agent is fact or fancy is a very different question from
whether we ought to insist that the government in its coercive dealings
with individuals must act on that premise.' 06
Of course, proposals to introduce behavioral science learning into
only the post-conviction stage of criminal law are not as threatening to
the responsible agent doctrine as those designed also to modify the
principles of criminal liability. But, absent a near abandonment of the
notion of individual autonomy, the introduction of involuntary behav-
ioral interventions as formal responses to crime can be regarded as af-
fronts to the dignity of human beings, which transcend the evil visited
by most other contemporary consequences of criminal conviction. The
interventions are not merely unpleasant consequences. They are deni-
als of the basic human status of the offender because they attempt to
determine future behavior which would otherwise be within his or her
control. Perhaps this analysis finally validates Justice White's conclu-
sion that the transfer of Larry Jones was "qualitatively different" from
traditional criminal punishment.107 What was important was not that
the facility to which Jones was transferred was outside the jurisdiction
of the Department of Corrections, nor that the transfer effected serious
and disadvantageous changes in the conditions of confinement endured
by Jones, nor even that the transfer was based on a determination that
106. Kadish, supra note 91, at 287 (footnote omitted).
107. 445 U.S. at 493.
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Jones was mentally ill; rather, it was that while he was incarcerated at
the prison he was dealt with as a responsible agent, but while at the
mental hospital he was not.108
Why should society ever respond to individual behavior by imposing
involuntary psychiatric treatment or other involuntary behavioral in-
terventions on the actor? Within this general justification category one
must consider initially the retributive notion that the morally necessary
response to crime is punishment. A possible corollary to the retributive
position is that any consequentialist use of the criminal sanction is mor-
ally wrong.'0 9 The proposition was derived in earlier discussion from
the argument that the introduction of therapeutic sanctions into the
criminal law would be inconsistent with the responsible agent doctrine.
For one who accepts a version of the retributive position which entails
a doctrinaire commitment to antideterminism, the conclusion may
seem inescapable that no involuntary behavioral interventions can be
tolerated in the penal system. For this reason, it is justifiable, in fact
morally necessary, that unpleasant consequences be visited on one who
chooses criminal conduct. But it would not be allowable to try to con-
trol future behavior by altering the mental condition or behavioral
make-up of the offender. If severe punishment is proper, complete
physical destruction of the criminal, rather than dehumanization by
scientific programming, might be the dignified and morally acceptable
means.
Most retributive theories probably are not inextricably bound to such
a pristine theory of self-determination. But even a more moderate ad-
herent of the retributive line may conclude that therapeutic responses
to crime are unjustified. Although therapeutic criminal sanctions may
be consistent with the view taken by the criminal law regarding the
nature of human behavior-indeed, even if the criminal law is not
based on any particular presumptions about the nature of human be-
havior-there may be no basis on which society can justify the practice
of responding to criminal behavior with coercive efforts to rehabilitate
the offender. For instance, therapeutic responses may undermine the
retributive principle that the consequence of crime must approximate,
both in kind and degree, the evil which it has caused.10 Alternatively,
108. This analysis is consistent with the special emphasis Justice White placed on the fact that
after his transfer Jones was subjected to the stigma of mental illness and to a compulsory behavior
modification program. Id. at 491-94.
109. See text accompanying note 101 supra.
110. "What kind and what degree of punishment does public legal justice adopt as its princi-
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a retributivist might simply refuse to acknowledge the validity of any
nonretributive theories concerning the justification of societal response
to crime, and therefore reject therapeutic responses because no retribu-
tive theory justifies them. Many who feel that the need for retribution
is a justification for the traditional punishment of criminals will not
object, however, to supplementing punishment with constructive ther-
apy. In fact, most who express a retributive view probably fall into this
latter category." '
If, on the other hand, a utilitarian approach is posited toward the
general justification of social response to criminal behavior, the use of
involuntary behavioral interventions should be accepted if and only if
the evil thereby created is less than the good it promises to achieve.' 12
A system is necessary to weigh the costs involved, including the dehu-
manizing effects of determining the future behavior of a convicted pris-
oner through coercive psychiatric or behavioral technologies, against
the social benefits that may be achieved by the therapies. Arguably, a
legitimate utilitarian argument can be made to justify the general prac-
tice of imposing psychiatric and behavioral interventions on criminal
offenders. It is important to recognize that because the evil visited on a
prisoner by these new techniques is "qualitatively different" from the
traditional penalty of simple physical incarceration, the proposed
practice cannot be presumed proper under the rubric of criminal pun-
ishment, but must be independently justified.
An obvious utilitarian justification for the use of involuntary behav-
ioral interventions would be an adaptation of the deterrence justifica-
tion of criminal punishment. Under one form of the deterrence theory,
the practice of criminal punishment is proper because it reduces the
overall incidence of harmful behavior (crime) by inducing the person
punished to avoid future criminal conduct.' 13 Because the evil created
by imposing unpleasant consequences on one individual presumably is
outweighed by the corresponding benefit conferred on society at large,
pie and standard? None other than the principle of equality .... Only the law of retribution (f/s
talionis) can determine exactly the kind and degree of punishment. ... I  KANT, supra note 97,
at 10.
111. See generally S. KADISH & M. PAULSEN, supra note 87, at 6-21. This is true even of
Mabbot, who seemed in the passage quoted earlier, see note 101 supra, to reject any formal re-
sponse to crime which could not be justified on retributive grounds. See Mabbott, Punishment, in
THEORIES OF PUNISHMENT 41 (S. Grupp ed. 1971).
112. See J. BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION
158 (J. Burns & H.L.A. Hart ed. 1970).
113. See H. PACKER, supra note 87, at 39-58.
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there is a general justification for the practice of criminal punishment.
One might argue that effective psychiatric treatment and other valid
forms of behavioral interventions imposed on offenders will reduce the
incidence of crimes by those persons at least as much as would punish-
ment.1 4 One might respond, however, that the costs associated with
the use of coercive behavioral interventions far exceed those created by
the use of traditional punishments. The balance struck between the
benefits and costs depends on one's views concerning such nonquantifi-
able values as human dignity and the sanctity of individual choice.
Consideration also must be given to matters of distributive justice.
The chief distributive justice limitation on the use of behavioral inter-
ventions arises from the notion of proportionality. Some method for
weighing the impact of the interventions is needed to determine
whether a particular technique can be used as a criminal sanction, and
if so, for which crimes and under what circumstances. Perhaps the bal-
ance should depend on the degree of intrusiveness of the interven-
tion, " 5 the seriousness of the crime, and the personal circumstances of
the offender. Depending on the degree of one's commitment to the
view that the autonomy of human conduct largely accounts for the dig-
nity of the individual, one might contend that any coercive tampering
with the individual's capacity to determine future conduct freely is a
consequence of the harshest kind, and thus less likely to be justified
than traditional punishment. No quantifiable standards can be ex-
pected, but, as in other contexts of proportionality, this should not pre-
vent our efforts to identify roughly the demands of justice.
C. Federal Constitutional Limitations
Constitutional limitations on the use of involuntary behavioral inter-
ventions as criminal sanctions also can be identified. These limitations
bear a strong resemblance to the considerations of criminal law theory,
even though the method of constitutional litigation is more circum-
scribed..
The relevant constitutional restrictions may be distinguished as ei-
114. See Glueck, Princiles of a Rational Penal Code, 41 HAIv. L. REv. 453 (1928). But see
Cohen, Aoral.Aspects of the Criminal w, 49 YALE L.J. 987, 1012-14 (1940).
115. For an interesting attempt to classify common behavior control techniques according to
their "coerciveness," see Note, Conditioning and Other Technologies Used to "Treat?" "Rehabili-
tate?" "Demolish?" Prisoners and Mental Patients, 45 S. CAL. L. Rav. 616, 619-21 (1972).
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ther procedural or substantive. 1 6 Although this Article deals primarily
with the substantive limits on the power of the state, a significant rela-
tionship exists between procedural and substantive constitutional limi-
tations, as illustrated by the distinct approaches of the state and the
Court in Vitek v. Jones. The Court's analysis followed a procedural
line.11 7 Involuntary psychiatric treatment and confinement in a mental
hospital was viewed as a deprivation of liberty, which could only be
effected by the state under the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment"" if adequate procedural safeguards against an erroneous
decision were provided." 9 Because virtually no safeguards attended
the transfer of Jones to the mental hospital, the requirements of proce-
dural due process had been violated. 2
The state, however, took the position that any deprivation of liberty
suffered by Jones was the legitimate effect of his criminal conviction.
The conviction completely took from Jones for the duration of his sen-
tence both the right to physical freedom and the right to avoid un-
wanted psychiatric treatment. 2 ' The conviction, of course, had been
accompanied by all the traditional procedural safeguards of the crimi-
nal justice system. Thus, no additional process was due in the state's
view. This argument should have caused the Court to shift from the
procedural issue of whether the Constitution qualified the state's power
to make the transfer by requiring that Jones be afforded certain proce-
dural safeguards to an in-depth analysis of a more fumdamental sub-
stantive issue: Whether the state could constitutionally regard the
criminal conviction and sentence as having divested Jones of his free-
dom from unwanted psychiatric treatment just as the sentence and con-
viction extinguished his right to physical liberty.
Justice White's forthright rejection of the state's argument indicates
116. See generall, L. TPimE, AMERICAN CONSTrruONAL LAW §§ 8-1 to 8-4, 10-7 to 10-9, 11-
I to 11-4, and 16-1 to 16-9 (1978).
117. 445 U.S. at 491-94.
118. "Nostateshall... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law. ... U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
119. See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
120. The statute under which Jones was transferred did provide for a marginal procedural
safeguard in the form of a determination by a physician or psychologist that the prisoner to be
transferred was suffering from a mental disease or defect and could not be given adequate treat-
ment at the prison. See note 7 supra.
121. At least this is how the Court characterized the state's position. 445 U.S. at 491-94. The
state's brief was not as explicit on the point.
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unquestionably that the Court did decide the substantive issue.' 22 Jus-
tice White's position can be conveniently restated in the form of a hold-
ing: The transfer of a prisoner to a mental hospital, even after
certification by a qualified person that the prisoner suffers from a
mental disease or defect, is not within the range of confinement justi-
fied by imposition of a prison sentence. The problem with the holding
is that the Court does not precisely state any theory of substantive con-
stitutional limitations. A significant case for substantive limitations on
the power of the state to utilize behavioral interventions can be con-
structed from criminal law theory." 3 The task is to identify constitu-
tional principles which also may lead to these limitations. At least for
those who agree with Professor Tribe that the Constitution is "an inten-
tionally incomplete, often deliberately indeterminate structure for the
participatory evolution of political ideals and governmental prac-
tices," 124 it will be no surprise that many of the theoretical arguments
already suggested for substantive limitations based on criminal law the-
ory have constitutional analogues.
Jackson v. Indiana 12s dimly outlines the essence of the pertinent con-
stitutional limitation in terms of a substantive due process theory. "At
the least, due process requires that the nature and duration of commit-
ment bear some reasonable relation to the purpose for which the indi-
vidual is committed."' 126 The Jackson Court also vaguely employed a
substantive principle that when state action interferes with an interest
protected under the due process clause, the end for which the state acts
must be a legitimate one.'27 A state may legitimately take steps to de-
122. Id.
123. See note 87 supra; Part U B supra.
124. L. TRIBE, supra note 116, at iii.
125. 406 U.S. 715 (1972).
126. Id. at 738.
127. The States have traditionally exercised broad power to commit persons found to be
mentally ill. The substantive limitations on the exercise of this power and the procedures
for invoking it vary drastically among the States. The particular fashion in which the
power is exercised... reflects different combinations of distinct bases for commitment
sought to be vindicated. The bases that have been articulated include dangerousness to
self, dangerousness to others, and the need for care or treatment or training. Considering
the number of persons affected, it is perhaps remarkable that the substantive constitu-
tional limitations on this power have not been more frequently litigated.
We need not address these broad questions here. It is clear that Jackson's commit-
ment rests on proceedings that did not purport to bring into play, indeed did not even
consider relevant, any of the articulated bases for exercise of Indiana's power of indefi-
nite commitment .... At the least, due process requires that the nature and duration of
commitment bear some reasonable relation to the purpose for which the individual is
committed.
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crease the incidence of criminal behavior. Psychiatric treatment and
other behavioral interventions may clearly bear a relation to that pur-
pose. Accordingly, no absolute ban on the use of such consequences in
the criminal justice system can be anticipated. 2 ' Certainly Vitek v.
Jones should not be read to establish any broad prohibition. The argu-
ment that behavioral interventions may constitute far heavier penalities
for crimes than traditional punishment has been previously noted. 129
When that is the case it may be arguable that even though a traditional
penalty under a specific circumstance would not offend due process, the
more intrusive use of behavioral technology may not bear the necessary
relation to the penal purpose.
Another tenet of the due process of law limitation is that;
[E]ven though the governmental purpose be legitimate and substantial,
that purpose cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental
personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved. The
breadth of legislative abridgment must be viewed in the light of less dras-
tic means for achieving the same basic purpose. 130
Arguably, traditional punishment sanctions are often less drastic means
to achieve the same criminal law purposes than are involuntary behav-
ioral interventions. In order to advance this kind of argument beyond
the stage of generality, one must specify more precisely the aims of the
criminal law and in what respect one type of response to crime is a
more drastic means of achieving the same end as is some alternative
Id. at 736-38 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis in original). See also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479, 497 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring). As is reflected in the text which follows, the
substantive constitutional limitations on the power of government to utilize involuntary behav-
ioral interventions as criminal sanctions are more likely to be seen as grounded in specific rights
concepts which have developed through gradual constitutional litigation than in the general con-
cept of "liberty" expressly protected by the due process clause. See generally L. TaB, supra note
116, at 564-75.
128. "Since confinement itself may be regarded as a crude form of behavior modification, it
seems clear that there can be no general prohibition against a governmental decision to subject
persons who have caused harm to at least some such techniques." L. TRIBE, supra note 116, at
911.
129. See note 115 supra and accompanying text.
130. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479,488 (1960). The least drastic means principle constitutes
a limitation of wide application in many areas of constitutional litigation. See, e.g., Hoffman &
Foust, Least Restrictive Treatment of the Mentally Ilk. A Doctrine in Search of Its Senses, 14 SAN
DIEGO L. REv. 1100 (1977); Struve, The Less-Restrictive-Alternative Principle and Economic Due
Process, 80 HARv. L. REv. 1463 (1967); Wormuth & Mirkin, The Doctrine of the Reasonable Alter-
native, 9 UTAH L. REv. 254 (1964). Thus, whether the constitutional limitation involved is
grounded on substantive due process or some other theory, the least drastic means principle may
become relevant.
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response. In this manner, much of the philosophical exchange which is
engendered directly by the criminal law theory debate, especially con-
siderations of utility and proportionality, may be incorporated into the
constitutional counterpart through the due process clause.
The argument for substantive limitations is strengthened by recent
constitutional cases which recognize individual rights in terms more
specific than those in Jackson v. Indiana.'3 1 These theories of rights of
privacy, 132 freedom of expression133 and mentation, 134 have been the
main ones utilized in the controversial battle over the right of civilly
committed persons against involuntary treatment. 135 Their application
to the corresponding rights of prisoners will turn on whether a criminal
conviction and sentence is viewed as leaving the offender with rem-
nants of those rights sufficient to support the same kinds of arguments
now being advanced on behalf of civilly committed individuals. 3 6 The
resolution of that issue depends on the appropriate ends of the criminal
justice system, and the extent to which those ends are served by partic-
ular behavioral interventions. Thus, the constitutional source of limita-
tion may vary depending on which theory is posited, but the nature of
the argument remains essentially unchanged from that suggested by
Jackson.
131. See note 127 supra.
132. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973).
133. The source of this right, of course, is the first amendment, which expressly addresses only
the power of the Congress. The freedom of expression guaranteed by the first amendment also
constitutes a limitation on the power of the state through judicial construction of the due process
clause. See Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380 (1927). The Supreme Court has held that prisoners do
enjoy qualified first amendment freedoms. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555-56 (1974).
Cf. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974) (holding prison mail censorship regulations uncon-
stitutional, but grounding the holding primarily on the first amendment rights of outsiders wishing
to communicate with inmates).
134. See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969) ("Our whole constitutional heritage
rebels at the thought of giving government the power to control men's minds."); Kaimowitz v.
Michigan Dep't of Mental Health, No. 73-19434 - AW (Mich. Cir. Ct. 1973) (holding that the first
amendment protects a person's mental processes because they are essential to the generation and
expression of ideas).
135. See, eg., Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342 (D. Mass. 1979) (right to privacy); Rennie v.
Kline, 462 F. Supp. 1131, 1142-45 (D.N.J. 1978) (considering each of the theories mentioned in the
text but relying ultimately on the right to privacy); Kaimowitz v. Michigan Dept of Mental
Health, No. 73-19434-AW (Mich. Cir. CL 1973) (first amendment rights, alternative holding);
Plotkin, Limiting the Therapeutic Orgy.: Mental Patients'Right to Reise Treatment, 72 Nw. U.L.
REv. 461 (1978).
136. A recent Supreme Court opinion makes it clear that a criminal sentence of confinement
does not extinguish all constitutional rights of the offender. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S.
539, 555-56 (1974).
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A similar result can be anticipated from an analysis under the equal
protection clause.137 For the most part, the state does not impose coer-
cive behavioral interventions unless the person to be affected is per-
ceived, typically through a detailed civil commitment process, as
severely disabled by an abnormal mental condition.13 There is a kind
of antithesis between the criminal and the involuntary mental patient
which, if it were entirely accurate, would render a person included
within one category exempt from the other.' 39 The one is subject to
extraordinary governmental action because his or her socially unac-
ceptable behavior is the product of responsible choice; the other be-
cause his or her socially unacceptable behavior is the product of mental
disability which is believed to preclude responsible choice. When the
state, as a consequence of a criminal conviction, claims the authority to
utilize coercive behavioral interventions without regard to whether the
offender, as a responsible agent, meets the standards for ordinary civil
137. "No State shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
138. Seegenerally THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW (S. Brakel & R_ Rock ed. 1971).
139. The contrast, however, is not at all complete in practice. Under the dominant form of the
insanity defense "[a] person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct
as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the crimi-
nality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law." MODEL PENAL
CODE § 4.01(1) (Proposed Official Draft, 1962) (alternative language omitted). Standards for civil
commitment, while they vary greatly among jurisdictions, see THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE
LAW 36-41 (S. Brakel & R. Rock ed. 1971), do not describe a class of persons which corresponds
even approximately to the class excluded from criminal responsibility by the insanity defense. For
example, in the District of Columbia § 4.01(1) has been judicially adopted as the standard for the
insanity defense. See United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1972). The standard for
involuntary civil commitment, however, is expressed in D.C. CODE § 21-545(b) (1973):
If the court or jury finds that the person is mentally ill and, because of that illness, is
likely to injure himself or other persons if allowed to remain at liberty, the court may
order his hospitalization for an indeterminate period, or order any other alternative
course of treatment which the court believes will be in the best interests of the person or
of the public.
Under these standards taken together, a person who engages in otherwise criminal behavior may
fall into one of the following categories: 1) Criminally responsible, not subject to civil commit-
ment, 2) subject to commitment, not criminally responsible, 3) both criminally responsible and
subject to commitment (eg., mentally ill and dangerous, but sufficiently able both to appreciate
the criminality of his or her conduct and to conform to the requirements of the law), or 4) neither
criminally responsible, nor subject to commitment. The last category arguably is illustrated by the
case of a mentally disordered person who is charged with commission of a property offense but
who has displayed no tendency "to injure himself or other persons." Cf. People v. Wetmore, 22
Cal. 3d 318, 583 P.2d 1308, 149 Cal. Rptr. 265 (1978) (defendant charged with burglary allegedly
acted under a delusion that he owned the apartment which he was charged with entering unlaw-
fully). In any event, the legal paradigms of the criminal and the involuntary mental patient are
theoretical opposites.
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commitment, 40 it makes a blatant differentiation between prisoners
and nonprisoners concerning liability to coercive behavioral interven-
tions. This is the kind of distinction at issue in Baxstrom v. Herold."14
Under the Baxs/rom equal protection pronouncement, "a distinction
made [must] have some relevance to the purpose for which the classifi-
cation is made."' 42  Arguably, criminal offenders are distinguishable
from ordinary citizens on several grounds that are relevant to the state's
power to resort to coercive behavioral interventions. It should be antic-
ipated, however, that, as in Baxstrom, these distinctions will not give
the state carte blanche to subject convicted offenders to behavioral in-
terventions. The most important step in the equal protection analysis
will be to determine the legitimate purposes of a criminal conviction.
To the extent that the social rehabilitation of offenders serves any of
those purposes, the state may have a basis for utilizing coercive behav-
ioral therapies in its correctional system without regard to the limita-
tions which prevent their use against the population at large. "43
140. As discussed in note 139 supra, the fact that the offender meets the test for criminal
responsibility does not insure that he or she would not also meet the standards for civil commit-
ment. Moreover, the criminal responsibility test is concerned with what the prisoner's mental
capacity was in the past when the crime was committed, while the civil commitment standard is
concerned with his or her mental condition at the time when involuntary commitment is to occur,
and in the future. The topic of concern here, however, is the use of a criminal conviction (for past
conduct) as authority for both punitive and involuntary therapeutic sanctions. If that practice is
allowed, the offender is made to suffer the adverse consequences associated with both responsibil-
ity and nonresponsibility simply by virtue of commission of a crime and without regard to
whether the otherwise applicable standard for the imposition of involuntary therapy is satisfied.
141. 383 U.S. 107 (1966). In Baxsirom the precise distinction challenged was that prisoners
nearing the expiration of their sentences could be civilly committed without being afforded the
same procedural safeguards as nonprisoners.
142. Id. at 111. The equal protection standard expressed in Baxstrom may be described as
one of minimum rationality. More searching standards of review are frequently invoked when the
challenged classification is viewed as "burdening fundamental rights, or suggesting prejudice
against racial or other minorities." L. TRIBE, supra note 116, at 1000. See general, Gunther, The
Supreme Court 1971 Term-Foreward" In Search ofEvolving Doctrine on a Changing Court A
Modelfor a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. REv. 1, 8-24 (1972). Although fixing on the
precise equal protection standard to be employed is not essential for purposes of the summary
analysis undertaken in this Article, it would be possible to argue for a more stringent standard
whenever a governmental discrimination concerns the use of coercive behavioral interventions.
Cf. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 546 (1942) (Jackson, J., concurring) ("There are limits to
the extent to which a legislatively represented majority may conduct biological experiments at the
expense of the dignity and personality and natural powers of a minority-even those who are
guilty of what the majority define as crimes.").
143. It is interesting that although the equal protection argument was initially utilized in the
Vitek v. Jones litigation, it did not form a basis for the district court's opinion, Miller v. Vitek, 437
F. Supp. 569 (D. Neb. 1977), and was not pursued by Jones before the Supreme Court. See Brief
for Appellee at 40-41, Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980). An equal protection theory based di-
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The eighth amendment prohibits the infliction of cruel and unusual
punishments. 1" Although the provision has not been invoked fre-
quently to bar specific practices imposed as the result of otherwise valid
criminal convictions, it does provide a viable check against extreme
penalties. 45 To an even greater extent than is true of the other consti-
tutional doctrines, the standards for testing a penalty against the eighth
amendment are vague enough to allow participants in constitutional
litigation to engage in the same kind of discourse as if the matter were
to be debated simply as one of criminal law theory.1 46 There is, how-
ever, a sense, probably attributable to the infrequency and discomfort
with which courts have found a punishment to be cruel and unusual, 47
that the eighth amendment provides merely a weapon of last resort in
all but the most egregious cases.
Former Chief Justice Warren's famous characterization of the prohi-
bition in Trop v. Dulles14 1 conveys the degree to which many of the
fundamental concerns of criminal law theory, especially those relating
to the proportionality principle, may achieve constitutional dimension
under eighth amendment analysis.
The exact scope of the constitutional phrase "cruel and unusual" has not
been detailed by this Court. But the basic policy reflected in these words
is firmly established in the Anglo-American tradition of criminal justice.
The phrase in our Constitution was taken directly from the English Dec-
laration of Rights of 1688, and the principle it represents can be traced
back to the Magna Carta. The basic concept underlying the Eighth
Amendment is nothing less than the dignity of man. While the State has
the power to punish, the Amendment stands to assure that this power be
exercised within the limits of civilized standards. Fines, imprisonment
and even execution may be imposed depending upon the enormity of the
rectly on Baxstrom v. Herold had been successfully advanced before lower federal courts in earlier
cases factually similar to Vitek v. Jones. See Matthews v. Hardy, 420 F.2d 607 (D.C. Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 397 U.S. I010 (1970); United States ex rel. Schuster v. Herold, 410 F.2d 1071 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 847 (1969); Chesney v. Adams, 377 F. Supp. 887 (D. Conn. 1974),
aJ'd, 508 F.2d 836 (1975).
144. The cruel and unusual punishment clause of the eighth amendment has been held to
apply to the states through the fourteenth amendment. See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660
(1962).
145. See Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980), See also Radin, The Jurisprudence of Death:
Evolving Standardfor the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 989 (1978).
146. See, e.g., Wheeler, Towarda Theory ofLimitedPunishment: An Examination of the Eighth
,4mendment, 24 STAN. L. REv. 838 (1972); Note, Aversion Therapy: Punishment As Treatment and
Treatment as Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 49 S. CAL L. REv. 880 (1976).
147. See Radin, supra note 145, at 997, 1010, 1030-31.
148. 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
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crime, but any technique outside the bounds of these traditional penalties
is constitutionally suspect. . . . [Tihe words of the Amendment are not
precise, and. . . their scope is not static. The Amendment must draw its
meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress
of a maturing society. 149
Several distinct, but related, constitutional theories are available to
impose substantive limitations on the use of behavioral interventions in
the criminal justice system. In general, a two stage analysis will be nec-
essary concerning the use of any particular behavioral interventions.
First, it must be determined which governmental aims for the criminal
justice system are relevant and legitimate. Second, the value to the
state of serving those ends by the means proposed must be balanced
against the individual interests affected by the particular intervention.
These considerations inevitably call for resolution of the same value
conflicts which are involved when the matter is treated from the more
openly philosophical perspective of criminal law theory.
III. EPILOGUE
My central purpose has been to offer a tentative model for analyzing
the substantive limitations on the state's power to respond to criminal
behavior by imposing coercive behavioral interventions on the of-
fender. The model is tentative in the sense that for the purpose of mak-
ing the analysis I have accepted certain crucial propositions concerning
both criminal and constitutional law, while recognizing that the valid-
ity of those propositions may legitimately be debated. The analysis is
also tentative in that I have left unresolved many conflicts between im-
portant principles and values. It is a model in the sense that my pur-
pose has not been to settle the issue raised here concerning
governmental resort to coercive behavioral interventions, but to pro-
pose a prototype for debating that issue. No final answers are intended
to be given here. I realize that participants in the debate may modify
or add to the legal propositions employed here, or substitute proposi-
tions which are in conflict with those accepted here. Others may em-
ploy a different philosophical, or constitutional, as the case may be,
approach toward the question of justifications for criminal sanctions.
Clearly, the conclusions that one reaches will be profoundly affected by
such alterations. I hope that because the analysis is a workable model,
it will be adaptable to such changes.
149. Id. at 99-101 (footnotes omitted).
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Ultimately, whether framed in criminal or constitutional terms, the
issue is whether or to what extent the state may treat a criminal convic-
tion as a sufficient basis for the psychological, as well as the physical,
imprisonment of the offender. I have been unwilling to state in the
body of this Article explicit conclusions about that issue because it
seemed more important to outline the nature of the debate which must
be fostered than to argue for the vindication of any particular set of
values. I do, however, want to present briefly my present predilections.
In the first place, I do not see how the same law which utilizes lengthy
prison sentences as the standard sanction against behavior deemed seri-
ously criminal, and which tolerates capital punishment in limited cir-
cumstances, can be expected to yield any complete bar against the use
of behavioral interventions. Objections, which may be founded in ad-
herence to the responsible agent doctrine alone or in retributive princi-
ples, seem merely academic. The operative considerations must almost
certainly flow from the simple utilitarian principle that a criminal sanc-
tion which produces more harm than good cannot be tolerated.
With this in mind, it seems certain that at least some coercive uses of
behavioral science technology in corrections will provide scant basis for
objection. It has been noted that the practice of imprisonment is itself a
form of aversive conditioning.5 0 In addition, if there is any truth in
the behaviorist's observation that virtually all responses to behavior
have a conditioning effect, then it scarcely seems objectionable that
prisons be structured so that the institutional responses to the behavior
of inmates generally have intended and presumably socially construc-
tive effects, rather than unintended and haphazard conditioning ef-
fects. 51
Beyond these nearly trivial instances of coercive resort to behavioral
interventions, I think there are sound reasons for a presumption against
the wholesale use of behavioral interventions as criminal sanctions. In
the first place, I think that the costs they entail in terms of lost human
dignity and, if they are successful, reduced human autonomy, consti-
tute heavy penalties to the individual affected. Thus, for the same
reasons that we do not indiscriminantly impose severe traditional pun-
ishments on most lawbreakers, we should be wary of the use of coercive
behavioral interventions. For a utilitarian, of course, an analysis of
cost alone is never sufficient. The benefits of most involuntary psychi-
150. See note 128 supra.
151. See generally B.F. SKINNER, BEYOND FREEDOM AND DIrNrrY (1971).
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attic treatments and other coercive behavioral interventions are highly
speculative. Few, and perhaps none that are likely to give rise to any
significant controversy in a correctional context, are validated by the
kind of respectable hard data which the law ought to demand.' 52 Thus,
at least until the state of psychiatric and behavioral science technology
advances markedly, only in rare instances will the probability of benefit
to society or individual even arguably outweigh the certainty of the
costs.' 5 3 Moreover, even if highly reliable and effective behavioral and
psychiatric technologies now exist or are developed in the future, we
should pause before employing them as powerful tools to enforce con-
formity to the many behavioral norms of a criminal justice system,
which is not in all respects substantively just and procedurally fair, and
which places an inequitable burden on individuals whose places in our
society have been arbitrarily determined by the accidents of class, race,
and disability.
The danger to be most feared is that the legal decisionmakers may be
reluctant to attach concrete weight to the values of dignity and auton-
omy. Unless those values are made truly significant in the balancing
calculation, the law's allegiance to the responsible agent doctrine is
hardly more a shield for the individual against the abuses of govern-
ment than is the determinism of the behavioral sciences. 54
152. The extent to which the available data is adequate to show that any practice is sufficiently
effective to justify its coercive use in a correctional context may be subject to much argument. It is
clear, however, that the behavioral science techniques are still at an early stage, with their effec-
tiveness subject to serious doubt. See generally J. ZISKIN, COPING WITH PSYCHIATRIC AND PSY-
CHOLOGICAL TESTIMONY (2d ed. 1975); Ennis & Litwack, Psychiatry and the Presumption of
Expertise: Flping Coins in Courtroom, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 693 (1974). See also Morse, supra note
92, at 542 n.25. Even Dr. Alan Stone, one of the most careful and persuasive spokespersons for
the use of coercive psychiatry, apparently does not claim that cogent data shows that existing
psychiatric practices are sufficiently reliable and valid for legal purposes. Rather, he merely
sketches an untested and incomplete model which he maintains could result in the successful
separation of that portion of psychiatry which is sufficiently reliable and valid for legal purposes
from that which is not. See A. STONE, MENTAL HEALTH AND LAW: A SYSTEM IN TRANSITION
(1976). I shall not attempt to assess whether any particular aspects of psychiatric and behavioral
science learning are adequate for application to legal questions. I do, however, stress that the final
judgment must be a matter for the law, not science. See Morse, supra note 92.
153. I do not mean to imply that supposed benefits to the individual who is the subject of a
behavioral intervention can ever justify the use of coercive intervention. The issue raised by that
proposition has been regularly debated at least since the time of John Stuart Mill. See Luirrs OF
LIBERTY: STUDIES OF MILL'S ON LIBERTY (P. Radcliff ed. 1966).
154. "[I]t is crucial to keep in mind... the positive side of the criminal law. It not only
provides for the punishment of the guilty, it also protects the rest of us against official interference
in the conduct of our lives. ... Kadish, supra note 91, at 273, 288.
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